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PRESSURE OF THE POPULAR: PRESIDENTIAL 
PRESTIGE AND THE HIGH COURT 
Timothy W. Clark† 
Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the 
Supreme Court. By Jeff Yates. State University of New York Press, 2002. 
131 pages. $17.95. 
 
Some argue the 2000 presidential election was decided by the 
judiciary branch (both the U.S. Supreme Court1 and Florida Supreme 
Court2), not the voters. While the 2000 election reminded us of the 
complex interaction that occurs among the judiciary, the presidency, and 
the public, there is limited scholarship on this relationship. Despite being 
written before the 2000 election (but regrettably not published until 
2002), Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in 
the Supreme Court3 is one work that begins to systematically analyze this 
interaction. 
This relatively concise and intriguing book explores the interaction 
between the United States Supreme Court and the presidency in the 
modern era. Popular Justice takes up the current and longstanding 
discussion where “judicial scholars assert that judicial decision making 
can be explained largely by attitudinal, external, and political 
determinants.”4  Specifically, this book speaks to the current debate 
within the judicial politics literature on whether the Supreme Court is a 
 
† Timothy W. Clark is a Ph.D. student in Sociology at the University of 
Minnesota and specializes in political sociology. His work focuses on the role of the law 
and the state upon extra-legal processes. B.A. 1994, Sociology, Ohio University; M.A. 
1996, Sociology, University of Georgia. 
 1. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). See 
also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000). 
 3. JEFF YATES, POPULAR JUSTICE: PRESIDENTIAL PRESTIGE AND EXECUTIVE 
SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT (2002) [hereinafter POPULAR JUSTICE]. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
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majoritarian institution (subject to public opinion held by the majority or 
the elites) or a counter-majoritarian institution (operating outside the 
influence of the majority opinion of the public or elites). In the second 
chapter, Yates succinctly reviews the status of theory and research on the 
connections between the presidency and the U.S. Supreme Court. In this 
debate where the non-majoritarian theories have long been a staple of 
high school civics classes, and oft-cited by the founding fathers of the 
United States,5 judicial observers have noted that in reality the court is 
less than free from outside influences. For example, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter noted that the court was constrained by the lack of ability to 
enforce its decisions and its reliance on Congress for annual funding.6 
Additionally, other judicial scholars suggest “[j]ustices are no less 
susceptible than other individuals in society to influence by evolving 
societal norms and values.”7 
Readers should be cautioned that the core of this short book 
(chapters 3-5) is laden with discussion of statistical analyses instead of 
the typical descriptive qualitative evaluations usually found in 
assessments of the relationship between presidential power and the 
Supreme Court.8 Yates’ methodological focus, while often providing 
very dry reading, is absolutely necessary. Yates begins to fill the void in 
the research literature where there has been a “relative lack of systematic 
quantitative analysis concerning how the Supreme Court has decided on 
presidential power.”9 
As a social scientist trained in quantitative methodology, I find that 
Popular Justice is an admirable, state-of-the-art analysis using sound 
statistical techniques that effectively tease out factors affecting Supreme 
Court decisions. Moreover, the book is an exemplary work using the 
scientific social science method to investigate an important social and 
 
 5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 7. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 89 (1993). See also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME 
COURT, 98 (Alfred A. Knopf 2001) (1987). 
 8. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY 
OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (Oxford University Press 1992); JOAN 
BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT (Congressional Quarterly 1997); SHELDON GOLDMAN, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA IN THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Paul Brace et 
al. eds. 1989); NORMAN C. THOMAS & JOSEPH A. PIKA, THE POLITICS OF THE PRESIDENCY 
(CQ Press 1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (Random 
House 1985). 
 9. POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 5. 
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political issue. Yates uses the latest and most appropriate statistical 
techniques to test a set of clearly defined hypotheses. In reviewing the 
methodology, I had no argument with any of his findings and was very 
impressed by his rigor and analysis. 
In this book, Yates quantitatively examines three discrete types of 
cases before the Supreme Court. Each analysis scrutinizes a different 
type of case before the Court. The first analysis focuses on cases dealing 
with the president’s formal statutory and constitutional powers. The 
second analysis examines cases dealing with federal administrative 
agencies, while the third analyzes cases deciding substantive policy 
issues. 
Yates’ analysis of cases involving the president’s formal statutory 
and constitutional powers was inspired by Ducat and Dudley’s earlier 
work on federal district courts.10 These researchers found presidential 
approval ratings and judicial loyalty to the appointing president affected 
presidential outcomes in the federal district courts. Yates essentially 
duplicates Ducat and Dudley’s analysis but focuses on the president’s 
public approval rating in Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, Yates’ 
analysis reveals “interactions between the Court and the president 
concerning the president’s formal powers are influenced by a variety of 
factors, including presidential prestige and the justices’ ideological 
inclinations.”11 
In chapter four, Yates shifts his analysis to cases involving federal 
administrative agencies. Yates believes the courts serve as a place where 
“[p]olitical consternation over partisan-based policy changes in the 
federal agencies are often resolved . . . .”12 Likewise, presidential 
scholars have noted that the federal bureaucracy has become one of the 
president’s most-valuable tools for implementing policy preferences.13 
Thus, the federal agency has become an extension of presidential power. 
Consequently this chapter’s analysis investigates “the deference paid to 
president’s administrative agencies by the Supreme Court justices by 
assessing the influence of attitudinal, political, and external factors 
 
 10. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal District Judges and Presidential 
Power during the Postwar Era, 51 J. POLS. 98, 98-118 (1989). 
 11. POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 46. 
 12. MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968). 
 13. TERRY M. MOE, The Politicized Presidency, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, 
135, 135 (James P. Pfiffner ed. 1991); TERRY M. MOE, The Presidency and the 
Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL 
SYSTEM, 437 (Michael Nelson ed. 5th ed. 1998). 
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including the impact of presidential prestige.”14 Yates found 
“presidential prestige affects justice decision making when the 
president’s cabinet agencies come before the Court.”15 
Lastly, in chapter five, Yates completes his analysis by looking at 
the effect of presidential prestige (and other attitudinal and political 
factors) for cases before the Supreme Court that decide substantive 
policy issues that the president actively supports. Yates’ analysis shows 
presidential prestige had different effects depending on the issue.16 
Presidential prestige had little or no effect on issues of civil rights, labor 
rights, diplomacy, or defense policy before the Court. However, 
presidential prestige did have a significant effect on issues dealing with 
law and order. 
Chapter six details Yates’ conclusions based on the sum of the 
findings of his three analyses. Yates concludes presidential power before 
the court does depend on the president’s current popularity among the 
population. Yates provides accurate and meaningful evidence that most 
scholars, if confronted with this same evidence, would have to conclude 
that presidential prestige, in most cases, had an effect on Supreme Court 
decisions. 
Reflecting on Yates’ findings leaves one with an uneasy feeling. As 
a typical American, I have been taught the cardinal truth that Supreme 
Court justices are insulated from external influences by nature of life 
tenure and by appointment.17 The thought that these life-tenured rational 
justices serving in the highest court of our land are swayed by popular 
opinion and the latest opinion polls may leave me (and I assume other 
typical Americans) a little unnerved. Thus, the evidence in Popular 
Justice leaves the reader with the feeling that all is not as it seems, and 
what we have been taught about the American “separation of powers” 
may not hold true. It makes one wonder about veracity of the other 




 14. POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4. 
 15. Id. at 70. 
 16. Id. at 102. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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